北京师范大学哲学与社会学学院 2008年5月26日晚 教四209  余纪元(JiYuan Yu)讲座

      相关材料的截选

Reconsidered

M A R Y   L O U I S E   G I L L *

2.   O V E R V I E W    O F    M E T A P H Y S I C S    Z

The basic structure of Metaphysics Z is widely agreed. There are two introductory chapters. Z.1 argues that the study of being must in the first place be a study of

18 See discussions of Burnyeat in Lewis 2000, and Wedin 2000, and the critical notice, Gill 2005a.

19  See the critical notice of Bostock 1994 by Wedin (1996).

20 Other Clarendon commentaries on the Metaphysics are Madigan 1999, on B and K.1–2; Kirwan

1993, on G, D and E; and Annas 1976, on M and N.

21  For articles on Met. M and N, see Graeser (ed.) 1987.

22  In addition to the collections mentioned in nn. 2, 13, and 14 above, see Bogen & McGuire

(eds.) 1985; Devereux & Pellegrin (eds.) 1990; and Lewis & Bolton (eds.) 1996.

23  Let me take this opportunity to make a blanket apology. So many studies have been published

in the past twenty years that this survey is bound to overlook some contributions even on its restricted range of topics. Furthermore, though I cite some publications in French and German, my emphasis is on English language publications. My aim here is to chart some of the major recent trends in the scholarly literature on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

24  The modern debate about particular forms in Aristotle was triggered by a pair of important articles  presented  at  an  Eastern  Division  APA  Symposium  in  1957,  by  Wilfrid  Sellars  and  Rogers Albritton.

25  A topic I won’t be able to discuss here, but which is of considerable importance for Aristotle’s

Metaphysics, is his critique of Plato. On this topic, with special focus on Aristotle’s fragmentary work On Ideas, see Fine 1993. Another topic omitted is the interpretation of Aristotle in light of the later tradi- tion. Gerson (2005) uses the Neoplatonists to show us a more Platonic Aristotle.

ARISTOTLE ’ S   MET APHYSICS   RECONSIDERED

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substance, since other sorts of beings (qualities, quantities, and so on) depend for their existence and for what they are on substances. To understand those other entities,  then,  we  must  understand  substance  first.  Z  (and  arguably  H  and Q) focuses mainly on that first task.

Z.2 lists examples of substance, starting with those generally agreed: animals and plants and their parts, and other physical objects. Some thinkers proposed other candidates, such as Plato’s Forms. Part of the task, says Aristotle, is to deter- mine which items belong on the list and which not, and whether there are some other substances apart from the perceptible ones. But first, in order to evaluate the claims, he needs to address a different sort of question: What is substance? What is it that makes those entities be or seem to be substances?

Z.3 states that “substance” (ousia) is understood in a variety of ways, but espe-

cially four: (1) essence, (2) universal, (3) genus, and (4) underlying subject. Some scholars think that these are criteria something might reasonably be expected to satisfy to be a substance. Others think they are reputable answers to the question: what is the cause of a thing’s substantiality? What is the substance of, say, Socrates? Is

it his essence, his universal or genus, or his underlying subject?26    Aristotle will reject some of the proposals (universal, genus); others (essence, and on some views the underlying subject) he will keep and clarify. Metaphysics Z is structured loosely around this list. Z.3 examines the claim that substance is an ultimate sub- ject and